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The Discourse of Nineteenth Century French Liberal Socialism 
Abstract 
This article analyses late 19th century French liberal socialist syntheses of liberty and equality, 
building on the existing body of literature on liberal socialism to illustrate the influence of the non-
Marxist left on its development through a focus on the work of the Radical, Célestin Bouglé, and the 
Socialists, Benoît Malon and Charles Andler. The analysis of these thinkers demonstrates the 
ideological similarities of liberal socialisms of thinkers hailing from both the non-Marxist left and the 
new liberalism. A concluding section suggests that liberal socialism offers social democrats and 
progressive liberals an ideological heritage from which to pose a radical alternative to contemporary 
forms of neoliberalism. 
Keywords: Liberal Socialism; Solidarism; Social Democracy; Liberty as non-domination. 
 
Introduction 
This paper analyses liberal socialist attempts to synthesise liberty and equality which developed in 
the latter half of 19th century France. These attempts were rooted in a conception of liberty as non-
domination, a form of negative liberty developed ‘as a form of power capable of containing the 
forces of domination and of particular interest’.1 This differs from the modern liberal conception of 
liberty as non-intervention, which ‘is the domain of action where individuals can do as they may want 
without interference on the part of others’, that can be traced back to the work of thinkers like 
Hobbes and Bentham, for whom individual freedom was the absence of obstacles,2 and was revived 
in the aftermath of WW2 by Berlin, in his, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’.3  
In liberty as non-interference a failure to interfere by people with power over others is reduced to a 
choice, leaving those potentially interfered with at their whim because s/he ‘is permanently liable to 
interference of any kind’. From the perspective of liberty as non-domination, liberty as non-
interference pays insufficient attention to situations in which the individual, without necessarily 
suffering attacks from others, finds him or herself obliged to live in a state of permanent and 
arbitrary threat.4 Liberty as non-domination thus grants importance to the idea that individual 
freedom involves ‘a kind of equality of opportunity and resources’, the ‘proper function of the State’ 
being ‘to promote this kind of equality’.5 
Because liberty as non-domination is concerned with the arbitrariness of the potential interference 
of others it does not, as do approaches based in the idea of liberty as non-interference, see the 
interference of the law as reducing our freedom.6 It presents democracy and the general will as the 
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‘keys to liberty’, with freedom defined not as ‘freedom from public intervention but freedom by 
public intervention’,7 the main threat to liberty stemming ‘from aristocracy, privilege, a caste 
mentality, and the private bodies that interpose themselves between the state and the people’, 
rather than from the democratic state.8 
In the period following the French Revolution for many thinkers political equality was vital to liberty 
as non-domination.9 Moreover, in relation to the struggle for national self-determination, ’a branch 
of republican thought proposed much more explicit democratic and egalitarian solutions’, Mazzini 
and Blanc linking ‘republican freedom to universal suffrage and [sponsoring] a conception of liberty 
that extended non-domination claims outside the legal sphere to social and economic relations’.10 
Liberal socialism represents an alternative attempt to extend such claims for non-domination. 
A relatively broad literature on liberal socialism already exists, which this study builds on. 
Kloppenberg argues that between 1870 and 1920 a ‘transatlantic community of discourse in 
philosophy and political theory’ was created which discarded ‘accepted distinctions between idealism 
and empiricism in epistemology, between intuitionism and utilitarianism in ethics, and between 
revolutionary socialism and laissez faire liberalism in politics’ which ‘converged toward’ a ‘via media’ 
in philosophy and the political theories of social democracy and progressivism, articulated by such 
philosophers as Dilthey, T.H. Green, Henry Sidgwick, Alfred Fouillée. William James, and John 
Dewey.11 
For Kloppenberg, social democrats sought ‘to extend the democratic principles of participation and 
equality from the civil and political spheres to the entire society and the economy, accomplishing 
without revolution the transformation from liberal democracy to social democracy’,12 bringing them 
ideologically close to the ‘new liberalism’ articulated by progressive liberals.13 That is, they were 
based on the principle of liberty as non-domination just outlined. The only French thinkers analysed 
by Kloppenberg, however, were Jaurès amongst the social democrats, and Bourgeois amongst the 
liberal progressives. Whilst this does offer some illuminating insights into the political culture of 
liberal socialism, the inclusion of Jaurès is open to some debate, and some of the characteristics both 
of social democracy and progressive liberalism, in the French context at least, are also questionable if 
one examines other thinkers. 
Serge Audier’s work on liberal socialism analyses a much broader range of French, Italian and British 
liberal socialists in unpacking the hypothesis that liberal socialism offers ‘an original path’ beyond 
liberalism.14 His work offers a detailed analysis of a wide range of liberal socialist thinkers, but suffers 
to some extent from his denial that liberal socialism could be seen as developing out of historic 
socialism, and as such, that it can inform contemporary socialist practice.15 This leads him to pay less 
attention to a number of socialist thinkers who articulated forms of liberal socialism, arguing that if 
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liberal socialism were limited to this aspect of the trajectory of socialism its contribution to liberal 
socialism would be ‘thin’.16 From this perspective the 19th Century French socialisms of Pierre 
Leroux, Proudhon, and Fournière which Canto-Sperber17 and Peillon18 have claimed as liberal 
socialist, have little to contribute to the analysis of the historical emergence of liberal socialism as an 
ideology, and liberal socialism as an ideology does not encompass such forms of socialism. 
This paper argues that amongst variety of responses within the left produced in the half century 
following the failure of the 1848 Revolution were found attempts ‘to reinvigorate the principles of 
democratic socialism’, associated with figures such as Jean Jaurès and Charles Andler,19 which did in 
fact contribute substantially to liberal socialist ideology. The failure to examine the role of these 
socialisms limits the analysis of the development of liberal socialism in the French Third Republic, 
and relatedly restricts any discussion of how socialists might respond to the challenges facing 
contemporary France through the rearticulation of republicanism based on liberty as non-
domination. This is demonstrated by an analysis of the ideologies articulated by three figures, one 
clearly identified by Audier as liberal socialist, the other two completely absent from his analysis. The 
first figure is the Radical, Célestin Bouglé. The second two are the socialists Benoît Malon and 
Charles Andler.  
The ‘maverick’ durkheimian sociologist,20 Célestin Bouglé, is clearly identified as a liberal socialist by 
Audier.21 A founding member of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale and a regular contributor to 
the Année sociologique from its foundation in 1896, Bouglé was also a founding member of the Ligue 
des droits de l’homme, for which he was vice-president from 1911 to 1924, and stood, unsuccessfully, 
as a candidate for the Parti radical et radical-socialiste in 1901, 1906, 1914 and 1924.22 Bouglé’s 
numerous works on Marxism, Proudhon, Rousseau, solidarism, and democracy before the First 
World War developed a strand of liberalism he explicitly described as liberal socialist.23 
Andler was one of the driving forces in the development of German studies in French academia.24 
Unmentioned by Audier, and largely omitted from English histories of French socialism,25 Andler was 
also a committed socialist. He was a member of Brousse’s Fédération des travailleurs socialistes de 
France (FTSF) before joining, firstly, the Parti ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire of former 
communard, Jean Allemane, then the unified French Socialist Party (the SFIO), which he left, ‘in a 
state of great dissidence’, after WWI.26 His fluency in German allied to his socialist activism made 
Andler familiar with Marx’s works―Andler had read the first two volumes of Das Kapital 
by1899―as well as with the works associated with the ‘breakdown [décomposition] of Marxism’, such 
as those by Croce, Labriola and Sorel.27 This underpinned his intellectual critique of Marxism in 
France and his development of what he labelled a ‘liberal socialism’.28  
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Malon was a leading socialist figure of the latter half of the nineteenth century, schooled in the 
tradition of federalist, Proudhonian socialism.29 A member of the First International from 1865 and 
of the Council of the Commune, upon his return to France following the general amnesty of those 
condemned for their activities in the Commune, he mobilised, firstly, in Guesde’s Parti ouvrier 
Française (POF), then the FTSF, before becoming an Independent Socialist. His foundation of La 
Revue Socialiste in 1885, together with the publication of his two volume Le Socialisme integral, in 
1890-91, formed part of ‘an enduring and powerful federalist, libertarian strand of French 
socialism.’30 Unmentioned by Audier, and, again, largely omitted from English histories of French 
socialism,31 his theory of ‘integral socialism’ demonstrates clear affinities with liberal socialism. 
The emergence of Liberal Socialism 
The liberal socialisms analysed in this paper emerged at a time of crisis for both liberalism and 
socialism. After the French revolution, ‘radicals’ were typically bourgeois liberals seeking economic 
and political liberalisation. As the nineteenth century progressed, however, individual rights to use 
wealth became institutionalised, and individual ‘liberty’ gradually lost its subversive meaning and 
became part of the common sense of political discourse. It was substituted, however, by ideas about, 
and demands for, greater social equality, both in terms of formal freedoms to participate in 
democracy and for improved material conditions for working people and the poor. Thus, as liberals 
such as J.S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville were aware, social equality came to be articulated with 
democracy, modifying the latter’s meaning from narrow political democracy to a more expansive, 
socialised democracy. 
Liberals sought to adapt to this changing social and political environment, exemplified by the English 
‘New Liberalism’ and French ‘solidarism’ of the decades prior to the turn of the 20th century. New 
Liberals consciously synthesised liberal principles and socialist values in a revived version of 
liberalism that promoted elements of social reform and a common ethical framework.32 They 
rejected laissez-faire and the idea that liberalism justified self-interested individualism. In the view of 
thinkers such as Hobhouse, Hobson and Wallas, and following J.S. Mill, the liberal promotion of 
‘individuality’ could not be realised without State action ‘to secure the conditions of self-maintenance 
for the normal healthy citizen’.33 New liberals aimed to diminish the threat of socialist demands for 
equality by appropriating its appeal to a common ethical framework in which the needs of the whole 
and not just the individual were attended to. This ethical stance enabled new liberals to defend 
holistic notions of ‘community’ and the ‘just society’ in which the State (as well as voluntary 
agencies) was charged with a ‘duty’ to enact measures of social reform to reduce the pernicious 
effects of poverty, inequality and ignorance.34 
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In France, solidarism came to prominence during the Third Republic and was promoted by such 
figures as Léon Walras, Charles Gide, Léon Duguit and the Radical party under the leadership of 
Léon Bourgeois.35 It sought to reaffirm liberal values by stressing its ethical character and reaffirming 
the debt the individual owed society, harmonizing ‘individualism, corporatism and morality within an 
essentially liberal framework’.36 Rejecting both Marxism and laissez faire liberalism for their reliance 
on (individual or class) self-interest, solidarism promoted a moral code of solidarity in which 
individual and collective interests were to be harmoniously balanced. The Congrès International de 
l’Education Sociale, held in Paris in 1900 as part of the Exposition Universelle, bringing together the 
leading supporters of solidarism, concluded with a resolution defining solidarité as ‘the idea of justice 
as the idea of a “social debt” by the privileged to the underprivileged, assuming mutual 
interdependence and quasi-contractual obligations between all citizens and implying a programme of 
public education, social insurance, and labour and welfare legislation’.37 These ideas supported 
proposals to provide for ‘collective welfare’, social insurance, free State education, limited forms of 
wealth distribution and legislation against trusts and monopolies. The solidarists, however, preferred 
voluntary schemes, mutual societies and cooperatives, rather than the State as the agency of these 
proposals. Bouglé’s liberal socialism should be seen as a radical contribution to this new liberalism, 
proposing political as well as social reform. 
Socialism developed early in France, Pierre Leroux claiming to be the first person to coin the term in 
1834,38 following the emergence of what was labelled ‘the social question’ in the 1830s and 1840s; 
that is, the social impact of growing industrialisation and urbanisation. This socialism sought to ‘re-
establish society’ on new bases of voluntary association as alternative matrices to individualism or 
medieval organicism.39 Socialist political parties did not develop until the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, however, due to the republican fear of factional interests,40 a fear enhanced 
during the French Revolution ‘by the perceived association between corporatist and regionalist 
movements and counter-revolutionary forces’,41 the indivisibility of the ‘people’ and the nation 
meaning that identification was not possible with both the nation and sub-categories within it. 
When socialist parties did emerge the combined effects of the repeated defeats of the 1830s and 
1840s, notably that of 1848, of the political oppression of the Second Empire, of the failure of the 
1871Commune, and of the repression of the early years of the Third Republic, together with the 
relatively slow diffusion of Marxism in France,42 fragmented French socialism across a number of 
competing parties.43 The Parti Ouvrier, formed under Guesde and Lafargue in July 1880, split 
between the more intransigent Marxists around Guesde and Lafargue44 and a grouping known as the 
possibilists,45 led by Paul Brousse, which broke from Marxism at the Saint-Etienne Congress of 1882 
and formed the FTSF.46 In turn the FTSF also fragmented, this process leading ultimately to the 
formation of a wide range of mutually hostile and contradictory French socialist movements.47 
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Whilst a number of parties were extremely hostile to the French Republic, notably the Parti 
Ouvrier,48 others had a more accommodating relationship to it, seeing it as a possible vehicle for 
socialist transition. The strongest party in this regard was the FTSF, the first socialist party which 
Andler joined, which was one of Europe’s leading advocates of municipal socialism, advocating ‘the 
socialisation of the commune as the best road to the socialisation of the state’.49 In practice, 
however, French socialism struggled to come to terms with its relationship with Republican 
institutions, the clearest example of this being the furore caused by Millerrand’s decision to accept a 
post as Minister of Commerce in June 1899.50 This ultimately led to the passing of the Kautsky 
motion at the Socialist International Paris Congress of September 1900, which declared that: ‘The 
entrance of an isolated socialist into a bourgeois grouping cannot be considered to be the normal 
beginning of the political conquest, but only as a forced expedient, transitory and exceptional.’51 
Such tensions were exacerbated during the last decades of the nineteenth century by the emergence 
of the ‘revisionist debate’ in the late 1890s, reflecting a sense that the catastrophist vision of Marx 
was not on the cards.52 Instead, as Eduard Bernstein argued, capitalism was proving amenable to 
political agitation and gradual reform.53 In these circumstances, socialist thought witnessed a 
distinctive turn towards ‘ethical’ as opposed to ‘scientific’ approaches to socialism. These tended to 
reject class struggle in the narrow sense of defending class interests and looked to socialism as 
principle of a new moral order. The work of Malon and Andler can be seen as contributions to this 
‘ethical’ turn.54 Such contributions were for a long time lost to history, however. The post-WWI 
hegemony of Marxism led to non-Marxist varieties of socialism being covered over by Marxist 
historiographers of socialism, this hegemony only being challenged in more recent decades.55 
 
The Ideological Elements of Liberal Socialism 
A close analysis of the political philosophy articulated by Bouglé, Malon and Andler reveals a shared 
ideological organisation around the following key features: voluntarism, socialism as the culmination 
of freedom, and the role of intermediary associations between the individual and the State. 
Voluntarism versus determinism 
Liberal socialists, the three thinkers analysed here included, emphasise the role of individual will, or 
choice, rejecting a materialist monism organised around economic or technical changes in favour of a 
voluntarism rooted in a broader synthesis uniting idealist and materialist elements. They unite 
idealist and materialist elements in a variety of different ways; there is no single metaphysic uniting 
them. All of them, however, result in some form of voluntarism, privileging the role of choice, and 
thus emphasizing the moral dimension of society. 
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Many liberal socialist syntheses originate in some form of neo-Kantianism. The works of Renouvier 
or of Henri Michel, presented by Audier as clear liberal socialists, are examples of this. Liberal 
socialists such as Andler sought to develop Marxism to remove the fatalist flaws inherent in the 
monist focus on the economy. Other liberal socialists, including supporters of solidarism, developed 
within the scientific framework of the sociological turn associated with Durkheim and durkheimians. 
There are overlaps between some of these approaches, notably in the work of Bouglé. 
The early socialists ‘were moralists rather than politicians, seeking a new moral social framework at 
least as much as an economic or a political system’,56 so that from the start, French socialism 
contained a strong voluntarist component.57 This was continued amongst the non-Marxist French 
socialism of the late nineteenth century. Much of the work of French socialists at this time sought a 
‘theoretical counterweight’ to Marx in previous, possibly more foundational, texts, to show that 
Marx hadn’t invented everything, and that the best of his work had precedents, the errors and 
authoritarianism stemming from Marx himself.58 This can be found in the work of Malon and Andler. 
Malon broke with monist economism, critiquing Marxist determinism as read through the prism of 
the work of Lafargue. He agreed with Lafargue that economic relations were a ‘central component 
of any socialist critique of social relations’ and that ‘collective ownership would progressively replace 
private property’, but became ‘increasingly critical’ of the fatalism and collectivist vision of French 
Marxists.59 Criticising Marxist determinism for its failure ‘to appreciate the plurality of forces 
operating in history’,60 Malon presented socialism as an ‘idea-force’61 found throughout human 
history, defined integral socialism as ‘socialism envisaged in all its aspects, in all its formative 
elements, with all its possible manifestations’, and argued that socialism was ‘the synthetic 
culmination of all of the progressive activities of humanity’.62 Surveying the historical development of 
morality ‘to show how, in each historical period reciprocity, altruism, and sociability progress’, 
Malon concluded that the end point of this development was a secular socialist morality wherein ‘the 
legitimate search for personal happiness or individual interest progressively’ involves ‘going beyond 
the limited horizon of each for himself in order to progressively merge with that of collective 
happiness or of the social interest’.63 
Malon claimed Marxism’s neglect of morality, the family and the State made it incomplete ‘because 
the roots of socialism plunge into all human sorrows, into all intellectual and moral progress, into all 
the maturations of history; the conflict is thus less determined and larger than is admitted by the 
exclusive partisans of class struggle’.64 Historical development was animated by the moral, affective 
or sentimental forces traversing it just as much as it was by productive forces.  Thus, the advent of 
socialism could not be deduced mechanically from Marxist historical materialism, the task of 
socialism could not be reduced to making the proletariat conscious of their class interest, and it was 
wrong that collectivists of all types65 ‘limit themselves to economic demands, and [do not] attach 
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themselves to any new conception of duty, thus depriving themselves of a considerable moral and 
attractive force’.66 
Likewise, Andler declared that ‘the mental and moral superstructure of societies is not only active, 
but decisive’, and that ‘the future emancipation is an affair of fraternal sentiment, of enlightened will, 
and of energy materially armed’.67 From the mid-1890s on he undertook a critical offensive against 
the theoretical bases of Marxism, drawing on the work of the ‘heterodox’ socialist, Otto Effertz,68 
Effertz’s disciple, Adolphe Landry,69 and the law professor, Anton Menger.70 
A fundamental aspect of this critique was his criticism of Marx’s understanding of economics, in 
particular of the Marxist theory of value.71 For Andler, drawing on Menger’s ideas,72 Marx failed to 
engage with the role of force in the generation of capitalism, and his refusal to envisage the juridical 
aspects of socialism blinded him to the idea that the distribution of surplus value stems above all 
from juridical conditions, which define both the structure of property and the status of individuals in 
society.73 The mode of production did not logically follow from technological developments, Andler 
argued, nor did the mode of distribution follow from any particular mode of production, Andler 
claiming it was often the mode of distribution which gave birth to the means of production.74  
Andler also radically contested the Marxist concept of surplus value. He argued that a portion of the 
value of a product was not produced by labour, but rather stemmed from the intrinsic value of raw 
materials, which Marx had been wrong to neglect.75 Moreover, surplus value was not realised solely 
through the production process, and production was not the main vehicle for its extraction. Rather, 
it was primarily realised through exchange, the ‘true exploitation’ occurring in the intermediation 
between producer and consumer.76 
From Andler’s critique of Marxist economic analysis, flowed his rejection of the economic 
determinism of Marx and Marxists, a conclusion he claimed was supported by Sorel’s and Labriola’s 
critiques of Marxism. He thus accepted Labriola’s rejection of Marx’s metaphysics,77 and Sorel’s 
remarks concerning the inadequate explanations Marx gives the base-superstructure relationship and 
his challenge to the idea that when ‘the infrastructure changes, the superstructure crumbles’.78 
Marxism failed to materially explain the social regime, because it could not explain the genesis of 
sentimental and intellectual modes of human activity.79 He thus agreed with Sorel that ‘one cannot 
talk of determinism because there is nothing determinable’,80 seeing ‘contingency not only in the 
primitive origin of modes of production, but in all the mediations which exist between this 
proclaimed infrastructure and superior products’.81 
Thus, in his Civilisation socialiste, Andler declared: ‘To be a socialist is to have undergone a complete 
internal regeneration, and a reconstruction of the whole spirit’.82 The new social structure would be 
born ‘of a new mentality of men, of a new creative faculty awoken amongst the multitude’. This 
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mentality would not grow automatically, but ‘must be produced through a conscious pedagogy’.83 
Attacks on Kantianism as ‘excessively “metaphysical”’ at the beginning of the twentieth century saw 
some republicans replacing ‘the neo-Kantian strategy of appealing to the normative ideal of individual 
autonomy with an argument that this ideal was in conformity with the scientific laws of evolution’.84 
This was the approach of Fouillée and Durkheim. Bouglé, however, made such a shift only partly. 
The maverick character of Bouglé’s sociology is shown by an eclecticism which prevented him from 
remaining within the Durkheimian sociological consensus without reservations, supplementing  
sociology ‘by doctrines which the majority of Durkheimians would consider―at best―as lacking in 
any sociological interest’, such as the work of Gabriel Tarde.85 Bouglé showed some degree of 
sympathy with the work of Marx,86 but the key difference from Durkheim lay in his neo-Kantianism, 
which led him to ascribe an original autonomy to the individual conscience.87 
Whilst Durkheim’s methodology eliminates individual motivation, Bouglé’s gives the major role to 
intentionality: ‘It is not necessary, as Durkheim believes, to explain the interior by the exterior, but 
the exterior by the interior. That is why I do not clearly distinguish sociology in the proper sense of 
the word from social psychology’.88 Like Mauss and Durkheim, Bouglé postulated that only the 
existence of certain innate mental capacities amongst primitive peoples could explain the transition 
from their magico-religious world to the rational and scientific modern one. However, whilst Mauss 
and Durkheim limited these innate capacities to such rudiments ‘as the capacity to distinguish 
between left and right and the past from the present’, Bouglé supposed in primitive man ‘a certain 
capacity to observe exactly and to reason from these observations’.89 Bouglé’s doctoral thesis, which 
drew on Durkheim’s work on the division of labour, ‘vigorously opposed’ the idea that the division 
of labour came about by itself, claiming that men must still consent to accept living according to this 
competitive mode of life.90 Durkheim suggested that men specialise in order to be able to live but, 
Bouglé argued, this is a choice, not something determined by social facts: ‘Unite and gather together 
as many men as you like; make their societies as dense and as voluminous as possible: if they do not 
want to live and live well, the division of labour will never be produced “by itself”’.91 
 
Socialism as the culmination of liberty as non-domination 
All of the thinkers examined here presented history as involving a process of increasing freedom, 
and socialism as the culmination of this process on the basis of a definition of liberty as non-
domination. For them true liberty depended on true solidarity, liberalism and socialism being in 
continuity, not conflict, because liberty and equality were mutually implicated. This is one of the key 
elements of liberal socialism marking its difference from Marxist variants of socialism, a synthesis of 
freedom and equality rooted in the conception of liberty as non-domination.92 For liberal socialists 
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this equation of liberty and equality was enabled through an emphasis on what was variously called 
solidarity or mutuality, though they differed to some extent in how they figured this solidarity. Many 
liberal socialists of the ‘sociological moment’, including Bouglé, were united around the idea of 
solidarism and the concept of the ‘quasi-contract’,93 this concept deriving in large part from the 
influence of Proudhon.94 For solidarists the social contract was the goal of society, not its origin. 
Such a contract was thus not real, but merely supposed, and retroactively consented to. Malon and 
Andler drew on the associationist tradition of French socialism noted earlier, although Andler wrote 
positively about the concept of the ‘quasi-contract’. 
Bouglé suggested that ‘modern societies had reached an evolutionary stage in which the affirmation 
of the equal moral value of all of its members had become the privileged―indeed exclusive―form of 
social union’. For Bouglé as for Durkheim there were two types of solidarity―one, older form 
which represses the individual; another, contemporary one, rooted in larger, more differentiated 
societies, in which society had an interest in respecting difference, and the equality of value of the 
human person was a principle of union.95 Thus, whilst sociology explains that the individual is 
determined and is deprived of true creative power, it also explains how the equal development of 
the personality of all members of society is the only possible form enabling the reproduction of 
contemporary societies. On this basis Bouglé rejected what he called ‘disorganising individualism’, 
such as that of Spencer, in favour of an ‘organised individualism’ based on the equal value of all 
individuals, the moral affirmation that we should desire the liberty of all and only accept conduct 
which is compatible with this objective, and the intervention of the social power in order to 
guarantee to all equal access to the conditions enabling the expression of this.96 A republic based on 
equality of opportunity did not hinder individualism, he argued, but deepened it through 
counteracting the impact of the caste system produced by economic inequalities in contemporary 
societies, which allocated to individuals the presumed characteristics of the caste to which they 
belonged. This made Bouglé sympathetic to the aims of solidarism.97 
Andler’s socialism sought to reconcile collective solidarity with the rights of the individual in ways 
reminiscent of solidarism. He agreed with Bourgeois in rejecting concepts of the State which tended 
to personify it.98 Noting that the relation between individuals subject to a private quasi-contract is 
that of being obliged without knowing, and suggesting that the State was ‘but a quasi-contract 
between all individuals united in their juridical community’, Andler argued that the quasi-contract 
was ‘the very form of all the obligations of public law’.99 
Quasi-contracts and social community share in common the fact that they both rest on an 
‘unconsented solidarity’. The solidarity which connects us, says Andler, is found before our birth, 
and we cannot repudiate it unless all life ceases. ‘The isolated man’, he says, ‘does not exist’, and, as 
such, there can be no question of social life being created by a contract. We are born riddled with 
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debts which life increases, and provided with rights also which it is our responsibility to increase’. In 
the modern division of social labour every man owes a debt to all other living men ‘due to, and to 
the extent of, the services given to him by all’. This exchange of services ‘is the subject of the quasi-
contract of association which connects all men’, and it is ‘the equitable distribution of services 
exchanged, that is, of profits and charges, which is the legitimate object of the social law’.100 This 
quasi-contract between individuals and those who govern ‘forms precisely the material of affairs of 
State’.101 Moreover, for there to be a heritage to manage a long period is necessary in which material 
riches and treasures of knowledge are accumulated. Thus, the individual who is a debtor to all those 
living is also indebted to the dead, and ‘the current State derives its strength from the wise 
administration of its forefathers just as it owes its weakness to their faults’. Asking how a debt to 
those no longer living can be paid off, Andler says that we do so by ensuring that the heritage is 
safely transmitted on to our descendants: ‘By an act of good will let us accept that we are obligated 
to the future generation by all that we owe to the past and the endurance of social life will be 
ensured’.102 
Andler explicitly termed ‘liberal socialist’ this reciprocity between the individual and society. The 
juridical epoch to come, he argued, would ‘erase the distinction between public law and private law’ 
through ‘claiming the control of all over the benefits that each draws from the human association’. 
This ‘is nothing other than what in vulgar language is designated by the term socialism’.103 Such a 
regime ‘freely’ recognises the debt of each to all … which is in accord with the 1789 doctrine of 
liberalism.104 
In tying the development of socialism to the broader issues of human historical development by 
emphasising the link between socialism and morality, Malon in turn linked morality to sociability, 
freedom to association. Morality, he argued, was not innate, but derived from social interaction: ‘The 
need for association is the mother, not only of morality, but also of the development of humanity’.105 
Darwin’s theory ‘only applied to humanity’s presocial existence as an animal in competition with 
other animals’, and with the birth of primitive associative social relations morality had emerged in 
the form of altruism,106 which took the following form: ‘In social relations, justice and solidarity. In 
human relations, sincerity and goodness. In relations with all other beings, moderation and pity.’107 
Progress ‘could be measured by increases in human sociability and altruism’, each age providing 
‘some insight into sociability’.108 Human evolution should thus be seen as a ‘process of improvement 
and broadening of the forms of human association, and, through these, of the feelings of sympathy 
born by man for his fellows’.109 
A number of issues flowed from the equation of liberty and equality enabled by what was variously 
called solidarity, association, mutuality, or solidarism. Firstly, it supposed the mobilization of other 
forces than those of interest or violence.110 This is clearly the case with the later Malon,111 and with 
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Andler.112 The emphasis on solidarity also broadened the focus of liberal socialism beyond 
satisfaction of the interests of one particular social group, such as the working class. For example, 
Malon’s socialism had a much more ambitious aim than representing the interests of a single class: 
‘the civic and moral regeneration of a society which was corrupt and without ideals’.113 Such a focus 
thus opened up the possibility of collaboration across social and political groups. 
If the fusion of liberty and equality made possible more pacific, more inclusive ways of figuring the 
political, it also opened up the possibility of resistance to the State. For social and political 
breakdown caused by this right to rebellion to be prevented from happening, all social groups 
needed to be incorporated into the decision-making process of society. Hence the focus by liberal 
socialists on the need to reform the political system to organise some form of intermediary 
associations between man and the State. 
Intermediary associations and the State 
Although opposed to collectivism, unlike many anarchists and the revolutionary syndicalists, who 
were completely opposed to any form of State, liberal socialists saw it as having some role to play in 
society.114 Liberal socialists rejected the authoritarian State, however, calling for the organization of 
some form of intermediary associationism working beneath, and with, the State.115 
 
Although critical of the excessive faith in associative action of Proudhonists,116 Malon’s emphasis on 
the ties between morality and sociability led him to call for a ‘solidaristic organization of labour’,117 
organised via a defensive and an offensive programme, initially organised around the establishment of 
international labour legislation (around such issues as the 8 hour working day), to be followed by the 
establishment of a general system of social insurance through the creation of a Ministry of Social 
Security, which would provide insurance against various forms of disaster and against sickness, 
accident, old-age, and family deaths, and of a Ministry of Labour, responsible for the social 
organisation of labour.118 This programme involved the collectivisation of property and the 
instruments of labour, a form of collectivisation he distinguished from that of communism as under 
his proposals ‘the forces of production would be placed “under the protection” of the State, but 
direction would remain in the hands of producers and their associations, and distribution among the 
able-bodied would depend on work performed’.119 A further element of this programme was the 
elimination of financial speculation, which he believed could be achieved by ‘progressively eliminating 
the public debt and by nationalizing financial monopolies like banks and credit institutions’,120 and its 
replacement by industrial democracy, through ‘the creation of compagnies ouvrières to direct the day-
to-day operation of the mines and industries, and, more generally, state and communal 
“administration” of the economy’.121 
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Malon’s reformist collectivism then was associative and federal, and gave an active role to both State 
and communes, the latter being presented as central to the achievement of socialism.122 Against the 
criticism that humans were only motivated by self-interest and that the collectivist society of 
socialism would thus not motivate them, Malon argued that ‘socialist society would leave sufficient 
room for individual initiative’, with individuals paid for actual work performed, the rates of pay 
reflecting difficulty, risk and unpleasantness, and those refusing to work being excluded from the free 
associations in which leisure-time social activity was carried out.123 Associationism would be 
enhanced by a second economic chamber ‘based on corporatively organised professional elections’, 
which would have sovereignty over the economic reforms noted earlier.124 A “political chamber”, 
elected by a truly universal suffrage, would have sovereignty over diplomacy, public order, education, 
justice, and other public services. 
 
Andler’s support for the role of the cooperative movement in bringing about a peaceful transition to 
socialism suggests he favoured an associationist approach to power. This is reinforced by his critique 
of Menger’s State socialism, in which he argued that ‘freedom of contract appears as a right of man’, 
and ‘the power to contract must be left to individuals’.125 For Andler, ‘in the face of the almost 
certain impossibility of achieving the social republic throughout the national territory with a single 
blow, the safest method remained that of achieving it in small ways through consumer cooperatives 
provided with their own production workshops, progressively federated amongst themselves until 
they comprise, if possible, all the workers of the nation across the entire national territory’.126 He 
thus argued that the social republic was fed by freedom of contract, rather than being opposed to 
it.127 Criticising Menger’s form of decentralization for being accompanied by a ‘rigid discipline’, 
opposed both to individual autonomy and to freedom of association, Andler argued that envisaging it 
might form the basis for future conflicts ‘is not a reason for sacrificing a precious freedom like 
freedom of association [liberté syndical]’.128 What the future socialist State needed to ensure was the 
‘reattachment of the union movement to the cooperative movement, in such a way that union 
members are interested as consumers in not abusing the situation that syndicalism assures to them 
as producers’.129 
Whilst for Bouglé there was a role for the State to play in diminishing the weight of privilege and 
inequality, he agreed with Durkheim in supporting a certain degree of decentralisation of public 
action. His argument that, after the Revolution, one could only find scattered individuals faced with a 
concentrated power, ‘an excessive “atomization” and an excessive centralisation’, from which 
stemmed the majority of the ailments we suffered from throughout the nineteenth century’, 
together with his criticism of Rousseau’s war on ‘particular societies’,130 led Bouglé to argue the 
need ‘to reconstitute for ourselves organs which fulfil, without perpetuating their defaults, the space 
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of the corporations which is left empty’.131 ‘It is only through them’, said Bouglé, ‘that we can achieve 
an effective decentralization: professional decentralisation’.132 Increased social and material mobility 
was undermining the local solidarities underpinning regional identity, whilst professional solidarities 
were growing in vitality, ‘the profession acting as the “soil” in which the modern man is most easily 
“rooted”’,133 producing a scenario in which rather than the provinces, the professions constituted 
specialised organs which ‘facilitate … the irresistible movement of industrial civilization. If the 
division of territorial sovereignty remains a chimera, that of technical sovereignty remains 
achievable’.134 Only through the federalism of the professions, he argued, could the “administration 
of things” replace the “government of people”’.135 
If Bouglé supported professional solidarities, however, he remained opposed to solid, closed 
associations from which could not freely leave. Opponents of administrative syndicalism, who had 
suggested that it would return France to the situation prior to the ‘unifying work of the Revolution’ 
of the state of division found in the Ancien Régime, were wrong, Bouglé argued, in their assimilation 
of the union with the corporation; ‘it is too obvious’, he said, ‘that in the new conditions of our 
industrial civilization, nothing resembling the closed, exclusive and oppressive corporation could be 
reconstructed’. The unions will ‘remain open’, the individual will remain free to enter or leave them, 
and they will work to restore equality between their members rather than maintain inequality 
between them.136 
 
Bouglé, Malon, and Andler all argued for a State role in ensuring social solidarity, whilst arguing for it 
to be balanced against the individual through the re-development of intermediary associations 
between the individual and the State. There were differences between them, notably around the 
forms of association. Were professional associations the only form of association to be formed 
between man and state, or were others (organised around consumption, around regions) also to be 
encouraged? All of them saw some role for economic association, but Andler, like Durkheim’s son-
in-law, the anthropologist, Marcel Mauss, and the cooperativist, Bernard Lavergne,137 focused on 
consumers and consumption, an aspect of association focused upon by the French cooperative 
movement. The similarity of approach between Malon, Bouglé, and Andler concerning the role of 
associationism clearly outweighs their differences. 
 
Conclusion 
Analysis of the French socialism which developed before Marxism demonstrates a high degree of 
‘family resemblance’138 between the new liberalism as articulated by Bouglé, and non-Marxist 
socialism, as articulated by Malon and Andler, although the resemblance between Bouglé and Andler 
is perhaps greater, and one might see Malon as the link between earlier forms of associative 
socialism and that later developed by such figures as Andler, Fournière and Jaurès. This is not to 
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suggest that liberal socialists from a new liberal background and those who were non-Marxist 
socialists agreed on everything―we have already noted areas of difference between them―or 
necessarily thought that they shared ideas with each other, but that there is sufficient overlap 
between the ideas of these thinkers to suggest that non-Marxist socialism can be seen as 
contributing to the ideological development of liberal socialism. 
This continuity across solidarism and non-Marxist socialism underscores the fact that liberal 
socialists were not merely evolutionary reformists, unconcerned with implementing dramatic shifts 
in social and political organisation, and suggests that Bellamy is wrong to state that solidarism and 
new liberalism both offered merely a moralisation of existing social relations under capitalism which 
promoted working class collaboration in the current economic system,139 certainly as far as France is 
concerned, the Radical Party’s programme of government under Bourgeois excepted. All solidarists 
argued the need for the State to facilitate equality of opportunity and mitigate the oppressive effects 
of economic liberalism, but at the same time sought some form of political reform to enable 
secondary associations to counteract the power of the State, preventing the State from oppressing 
the individual in turn, and thus enhancing the freedom of the individual. They were joined in this, 
however, by socialists such as Malon and Andler, who denied that the violent break emphasised by 
Marxist theory and practice was the correct means to make the transition to a more democratic 
society. To be sure, they based such claims on different metaphysical grounds: in some a critique of 
the economic monism of French Marxism, in others, the newly developing sociology. All, however, 
were driven by these different approaches to argue that equality and liberty were mutually related. 
The individual liberty of laisser faire individualism was a false freedom, but State intervention in the 
name of equality risked crushing the individual. Only through a system based on reciprocity, in which 
each recognised the debt they owed to the collectivity for their own freedom, would the 
revolutionary triumvirate of liberty, equality and fraternity be united. 
Accepting non-Marxist socialism’s contribution to liberal socialism concerns more than merely 
intellectual curiosity; it has implications for the way forward for the left in the current conjuncture. 
The triumph of Thatcherism and the subsequent emergence of Blairism in the UK, whatever the 
failings, in both theory and practice, of both of these, and the neo-liberalization of much of the 
European social democratic left from the 1980s on, have all called into question the social 
democratic model which developed following the Second World War. And yet, as inequality grows 
greater across the West,140 the need for a radical alternative to neo-liberalism, through the 
development of 'new forms of socialisation and mutualisation' has never been greater.141 A liberal 
socialist framework offers social democrats and progressive liberals precisely such an alternative 
through its basis in reciprocity, adapted to take account of the changed social, economic and political 
circumstances of the contemporary world.142 
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